

Resilience against quantum (and other) threats with crypto agility

C C W
C C Y W C



CYBERSEC



Cryptography is Everywhere

Devices

- ❖
- ❖ Y C C
- ❖ Y C
- ❖ C C
- ❖
- ❖ C
- ❖ W
- ❖ WW
- ❖


Interactions

- ❖ Wc
- ❖ C YY
- ❖ Y
- ❖
- ❖

Domain

- ❖ Y W C
- ❖ W C
- ❖ C C
- ❖ W
- ❖

WITHOUT SECURE CRYPTOGRAPHY, OUR SOCIETY COLLAPSES



Cryptography Under Threat

Cryptographically relevant quantum computers

Would be able to break modern (public-key) cryptography

“To ensure an acceptable level of readiness, we recommend that [the most sensitive use cases] should be protected against ‘store now, decrypt later’ attacks as soon as possible, latest by the end of 2030.”

Y C Y C C C Y Y Y C



Other threats


- ❖ C Y C
- ❖ C W
- ❖ W Y C Y WY B Y C C



NEWS COMPUTING

PC “Quantum-Safe” Crypto Hacked by 10-Year-Old

> Many challenges still lie ahead for postquantum cryptography

BY CHARLES Q. CHOI | 19 AUG 2022 | 7 MIN READ | 

Charles Q. Choi is a contributing editor for IEEE Spectrum.

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TAGS

QUANTUM COMPUTING

CRYPTOGRAPHY NIST

POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRA...

FUTURE QUANTUM COMPUTERS may rapidly break modern cryptography. Now researchers find that a promising algorithm designed to protect computers from these advanced attacks could get broken in just 4 minutes. And the catch is that 4-minute time stamp was not achieved by a cutting-edge machine but by a regular 10-year-old desktop computer. This latest, surprising defeat highlights the many hurdles postquantum cryptography will need to clear before adoption, researchers say.

Cryptography Under Threat

Cryptographically relevant quantum computers

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“To ensure an acceptable level of readiness, we recommend that [the most sensitive use cases] should be protected against ‘store now, decrypt later’ attacks as soon as possible, latest by the end of 2030.”

Y C Y C C C Y Y Y C



Other threats

- ❖ C Y C
- ❖ C W
- ❖ W Y W Y W Y C C



→ MIGRATE ON TIME TO RECOMMENDED CRYPTOGRAPHY

Cryptographic migrations

- Insecure
- Phase-out
- Secure / Recommended
- Planned


SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION



SECURE HASH FUNCTION



PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY



**MULTIPLE CRYPTO
MIGRATIONS IN THE PAST**

**SLOW, CUMBERSOME
AND EXPENSIVE PROCESS
- TAKES 5 TO 15 YEARS
TO MIGRATE**

Cryptographic migrations

- Insecure
- Phase-out
- Secure / Recommended
- Planned


SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION



SECURE HASH FUNCTION



PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY



**POTENTIALLY
MULTIPLE CRYPTO
MIGRATIONS IN THE
NOT-SO-DISTANT
FUTURE!**

**BECOMING
QUANTUM-READY
MAY NOT BE A ONE-
TIME SHOT**

Transitional period in Hybrid Mode




Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

The quantum-safe algorithms that are currently being standardized are not yet as well researched as the "classical" methods (for example RSA and ECC). This applies in particular to weaknesses that largely only become apparent in applications, such as typical implementation errors, possible side-channel attacks, etc. BSI therefore recommends that post-quantum cryptography should not be used in isolation if possible, but only in hybrid mode, i.e. in combination with classical algorithms. [...] Hash-based signatures can in principle also be used on its own (i.e., not in hybrid mode).

Y c c Y W α
W Y c YY c

→ EVEN MORE MIGRATIONS!

W



Crypto migrations

Challenge

- ❖ W W Y W W C
 - ❖ W Y C Y C C Y C
- How to facilitate smooth migrations?

Approach

C C W C Y W W
Y Y C C
C C Y Y C Y

We should accept this and act on it!

Improve cryptographic maturity

Insight

Crypto inventory

C C C
C

Guidance

Crypto policy

C C
W

Flexibility

Crypto agility

C W C Y
C Y Y




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 Y W c c c W W



W

← Handshake →

← Secure channel →



C C

Handshake




- C C C
- C C
-
- C C

Supported cipher suites

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Supported cipher suites

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256



Cryptographic functions: Hardware, software, firmware, algorithms, parameters, ...

W Y c c W Y c c c W c c c W c c c Y c

C C C C
 Y W c c c W W



W

← Handshake →

← Secure channel →



C C

Handshake

- C C C
- C C
-
- C C

Supported cipher suites

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256




Supported cipher suites

TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256



Cryptographic Agility

On the level of an IT system




Cryptographic functions: Hardware, software, firmware, algorithms, parameters, ...

C C W C

Service developed by Smals



Functionality



Motivation

- ❖ Cost reduction by reuse
- ❖ Increase security
- ❖ Crypto agility!

CRYPTO AGILITY AND COST EFFICIENCY CAN COEXIST




C W C Y C W B Y C C C W |




Possible Future Architecture





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

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Possible Future Architecture




Possible Future Architecture



Crypto-Agility Maturity Model (CAMM)

Proposal – not yet standardized or adopted – for IT-systems



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


Challenges & open questions

Performance
Standards
QR-codes
Advanced cryptography
X.509 certificates
HSMs

Research on CA
Legacy
Downgrade attacks
IoT
Cryptographic accelerators


Middleboxes
Incompatibilities
Guidance
Smartcards



**BECOMING QUANTUM-READY IS HARD, BECOMING CRYPTO AGILE EVEN HARDER
BUT... IT PAYS OFF IN THE LONG RUN!**

W B Y C C C W |

Takeaways



❖ C Y C Y C
❖ C Y Y W W
❖ C Y C W Y C Y
❖ C W C W W C C
C W

❖ We are early

BECOME A CHEETAH: EMBRACE CRYPTO AGILITY!

IT WILL BE YOUR CORNERSTONE IN ADAPTING TO
YOUR FUTURE CRYPTOGRAPHIC NEEDS



Thanks for your attention!

B
C

W Y
C

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