

DEVOXX™

#Devoxx #Smals


**Physical
masks**

**Written
pseudonyms**

**Digital
pseudonyms**


Innovation @ Smals Research

Smart Pseudonymisation



Format-Preserving Pseudonymisation

- Problem statement
- Concept
- Experimental service
- Conclusion



Format-Preserving Pseudonymisation

- **Problem statement**
- Concept
- Experimental service
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Widespread use of personal data in non-prod environments

A BM B M M

B B M VB M

Security

2016

UBER

2021

T Mobile™

2022

LastPass...|

No negligible risk!

Compliance with GDPR

Personal data in TEST/ACC

❖ *Legal basis*

- Informed and actively given consent?
- Legitimate interest (gerechtvaardigd belang) of organisation?
- Special categories of personal data
Minors, medical data, sexual orientation, criminal data, ...
- Other legal basis?

❖ *Appropriate measures*

- Security TEST < PROD/ACC

Pseudonymisation


- ❖ Encouraged by GDPR to protect personal data
- ❖ Some rules by GDPR more **relaxed**
- ❖ Could help become more compliant

GDPR, Art 32.

[...] *the controller and the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, including inter alia as appropriate:*

- the **pseudonymisation** and encryption of personal data;*
- [...]

Reality in public sector



Question customer

**How to improve privacy
in TEST & ACC?**

not


Because

Format-Preserving Pseudonymisation


- Problem statement
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Current practice



Approach by member



1. Pseudonymise

- Bidirectional
- By Smals Research

2. Shuffle



- Unidirectional
- By Customer

Transformed snapshot


Identifier	First name	Surname

Records useful for TEST & ACC, while hard to identify!


PoC in collaboration with customer




PoC in collaboration with customer



PoC in collaboration with customer




Reality in public sector



Question customer

**How to improve privacy
in TEST & ACC?**


not




- ❖ No impact on legacy applications
- ❖ Minimal infrastructural complexity

Encryption

TRADITIONAL ENCRYPTION



FORMAT-PRESERVING ENCRYPTION



Format-Preserving Pseudonymisation

- Problem statement
- Concept
- **Experimental service**
- Conclusion



Experimental REST service



B M M

Rest API

- ✓ M BM B
- ✓
- ✓ M


Identifiers

- ✓
- ✓ Y MB



POST Request

```
1 {
2   "context": {
3     "security-group": "ehealth",
4     "application": "quatro",
5     "environment": "TEST"
6   },
7   "identifiers": [
8     "18.32.08-902.42",
9     "30.02.06-981.94",
10    "72.43.27-109.21",
11    "58.28.16-291.62",
12    "58.28.16-29X.61",
13    "58.28.16-291.90",
14    "79.27.28-621.96",
15    "30.43.04-205.53"
16  ]
17 }
18
19
```



POST Response

```
1 {
2   "context": {
3     "security-group": "ehealth",
4     "application": "quatro",
5     "environment": "TEST"
6   },
7   "time": "2024-01-08T08:20:39.128207895Z",
8   "translation-info": {
9     "action": "pseudonymize",
10    "enabled": true
11  },
12  "translations": [
13    {
14      "identifier": "18.32.08-902.42",
15      "pseudonym": "30.43.30-213.41",
16      "valid": true
17    },
18    {
19      "identifier": "30.02.06-981.94",
20      "pseudonym": "66.08.15-286.27",
21      "valid": true
22    },
23    {
24      "identifier": "72.43.27-109.21",
25      "pseudonym": "22.51.14-602.20",
26      "valid": true
27    },
28    {
29      "identifier": "58.28.16-291.62",
30      "pseudonym": "null",
31      "valid": false,
32      "error": "checksum"
33    }
34  ]
35 }
```

Format-Preserving Pseudonymisation

- Problem statement
- Concept
- Experimental service
- **Conclusion**




Format-Preserving Pseudonymisation

Building block


As a Service

Status




Innovation @ Smals Research

Smart Pseudonymisation




eHealth Blind Pseudonymisation

- Problem statement
- Referral prescriptions
- Join & pseudonymise data for research
- Conclusion



eHealth Blind Pseudonymisation

- **Problem statement**
- Referral prescriptions
- Join & pseudonymise data for research
- Conclusion



Design principles



Privacy by design



Separation of duties




Simplicity



eHealth Blind Pseudonymisation

- Problem statement
- **Referral prescriptions**
- Join & pseudonymise data for research
- Conclusion




Referral prescription = Verwijsvoorschrift / Prescription de renvoi

What?


Requirements

- ❖ Pseudonymisation
- ❖ Partial encryption

Scenario 1



Scenario 2



Blind Pseudo Service Pseudonymise

✓ Each party only sees only what it needs to see

- ❖
- ❖
- ❖

→ Maximizes security & privacy


✓ Direct communication

- ❖
- ❖

✓ Low-intrusive client-side

- ❖
- ❖

Structure blinded identifier, blinded pseudonym and final pseudonym



Referral prescription = Verwijsvoorschrift / Prescription de renvoi


What?

Requirements


❖ Pseudonymisation

❖ Partial encryption

Scenario 1




Scenario 2




Blind Pseudonymisation Service

Encrypt




eHealth Blind Pseudonymisation

- Problem statement
- Referral prescriptions
- **Join & pseudonymise data for research**
- Conclusion




Join & pseudonymise data for research




- ✓ Each party only sees what is absolutely necessary
- ✓ Business flow not interrupted
- ✓ Low-intrusive client-side
- ✓ Efficient reuse of existing infrastructure

eHealth Blind Pseudonymisation

- Problem statement
- Referral prescriptions
- Join & pseudonymise data for research
- **Conclusion**



eHealth Blind Pseudonymisation



Privacy by design

- ✓
- ✓
- ✓

Separation of duties



Simplicity


- ✓
- ✓

Live with uptake



Innovation @ Smals Research

Smart Pseudonymisation



Oblivious Join

- Problem statement
- Concept
- In practice
- Conclusion



Oblivious Join


- **Problem statement**
- Concept
- In practice
- Conclusion




Concrete case

Research question

Involved citizens



Naive flow



How can BCR deliver only records about MS patients without learning who has MS?


Challenge

Constraint

Requirements

- ❖ Privacy-friendly
- ❖ Uniform
- ❖ No data aggregation
- ❖ Easy to use

Focus: set intersection




Extensible from there

Oblivious Join

- Problem statement
- **Concept**
- In practice
- Conclusion



Concept



Data sources

- ❖
- ❖

Collector


- ❖
- ❖
- ❖

Properties

- ✓
- ✓
- ✓
- ✓

3 steps protocol

Concept




No collusion
between data
source and
collector

Properties



3 steps

Concept



Collector


Independent and semi-trusted

Oblivious Join

- Problem statement
- Concept
- **In practice**
- Conclusion



In practice



Client

Project description

Input files

Output file

Test with fictional data



Extract input CSV

Data source 1 (IMA-AIM)

60.01.03-231.73	Teriflunomide
60.01.03-562.33	Alemtuzumab
60.01.03-697.92	Glatiramer acetate
60.01.04-606.56	Interferon beta
60.01.04-681.78	Dimethyl fumarate
60.01.05-045.05	Teriflunomide
60.01.05-186.58	Tysabri
60.01.05-617.15	Ocrelizumab
60.01.05-715.14	Alemtuzumab

200 000 records



Extract input CSV

Data source 2 (BCR)

60.01.03-782.07	Melanoma	3	G1
60.01.04-124.53	Colorectal	1	G3
60.01.04-345.26	Prostate	2	G2
60.01.04-562.03	Breast	2	G1
60.01.05-045.05	Lung	1	G3
60.01.05-893.30	Pancreas	4	G2
60.01.06-401.07	Breast	3	G1
60.01.06-696.03	Stomach	2	G1
60.01.07-203.78	Thyroid	1	G3

500 000 records




Extract input CSV

Data source 3 (FPS Health)

60.01.03-542.53	C
60.01.03-559.36	G
60.01.03-606.86	D
60.01.03-697.92	A
60.01.04-697.62	G
60.01.04-816.40	B
60.01.05-045.05	D
60.01.06-701.95	B
60.01.06-886.07	F

1 000 000 records

Set IMA-AIM



Test with fictional data



Extract input CSV

Data source 1 (IMA-AIM)

60.01.03-231.73	Teriflunomide
60.01.03-562.33	Alemtuzumab
60.01.03-697.92	Glatiramer acetate
60.01.04-606.56	Interferon beta
60.01.04-681.78	Dimethyl fumarate
60.01.05-045.05	Teriflunomide
60.01.05-186.58	Tysabri
60.01.05-617.15	Ocrelizumab
60.01.05-715.14	Alemtuzumab

200 000 records



Extract input CSV

Data source 2 (BCR)

60.01.03-782.07	Melanoma	3	G1
60.01.04-124.53	Colorectal	1	G3
60.01.04-345.26	Prostate	2	G2
60.01.04-562.03	Breast	2	G1
60.01.05-045.05	Lung	1	G3
60.01.05-893.30	Pancreas	4	G2
60.01.06-401.07	Breast	3	G1
60.01.06-696.03	Stomach	2	G1
60.01.07-203.78	Thyroid	1	G3

500 000 records



Extract input CSV

Data source 3 (FPS Health)

60.01.03-542.53	C
60.01.03-559.36	G
60.01.03-606.86	D
60.01.03-697.92	A
60.01.04-697.62	G
60.01.04-816.40	B
60.01.05-045.05	D
60.01.06-701.95	B
60.01.06-886.07	F

1 000 000 records

Extract output CSV

Collector (KSZ)

50 000 records



99338454821...	Teriflunomide	Lung	3	G1	F
12056965607...	Alemtuzumab	Cervix uteri	2	G2	B
15380767762...	Daclizumab	Pancreas	1	G2	A
15380767762...	Teriflunomide	Lung	1	G3	D
31309444464...	Ocrelizumab	Stomach	3	G1	C
99921347021...	Dimethyl fumarate	Breast	2	G2	H
69025938558...	Ofatumumab	Prostate	3	G3	A
38469942453...	Alemtuzumab	Melanoma	4	G1	E
18048091119...	Aubagio	Prostate	3	G3	D

Who sees what?



Test with fictional data



Extract input CSV

Data source 1 (IMA-AIM)

60.01.03-231.73	Teriflunomide
60.01.03-562.33	Alemtuzumab
60.01.03-697.92	Glatiramer acetate
60.01.04-606.56	Interferon beta
60.01.04-681.78	Dimethyl fumarate
60.01.05-045.05	Teriflunomide
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60.01.05-617.15	Ocrelizumab
60.01.05-715.14	Alemtuzumab

200 000 records



Extract input CSV

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60.01.03-782.07	Melanoma	3	G1
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500 000 records




Extract input CSV

Data source 3 (FPS Health)

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60.01.03-559.36	G
60.01.03-606.86	D
60.01.03-697.92	A
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60.01.04-816.40	B
60.01.05-045.05	D
60.01.06-701.95	B
60.01.06-886.07	F

1 000 000 records

Set IMA-AIM



Performance test

Parameters

Infrastructure

Results

< 2 min calculations

Oblivious Join

- Problem statement
- Concept
- In practice
- **Conclusion**



Collaboration universities

Interdisciplinary paper (To be published in 2024)

Privacy-By-Design in the Belgian Public Sector

Pseudonymising & Joining Personal Data Fragmented over Multiple Organisations



In Public Governance and Emerging Technologies – Values, Trust, and Compliance by Design



Utrecht
University

SPRINGER NATURE

Expert paper

Evaluation


Advantages



Challenges




Opportunities



Wrapping up

Innovation @ Smals Research

Smart Pseudonymisation



Smart pseudonymisation can play a crucial role to protect personal data

Further reading
www.smalsresearch.be

Thanks for your attention



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in [linkedin.com/in/verslype](https://www.linkedin.com/in/verslype)

🌐 www.smals.be
www.smalsresearch.be
www.cryptanium.eu



www.smalsresearch.be/tag/pseudonymisation/

Images



Judy Dean



estorde



Pixabay



Aris Gionis



Daniel Bruce



Oscar Gende Villar